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The Hierarchy of Differing Behavioural Standards in Labour Law: A Case for 
Limited Re-alignment? 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper pursues a line of enquiry regarding employment laws which promulgate 
standards (rather than rules), the legitimacy of which is premised on the need to scrutinise 
managerial autonomy pursuant to a norm-setting, rather than norm-reflecting agenda. 
Insights will be offered in relation to the expectations about the exercise of the managerial 
prerogative which the law transmits through such standards. The argument is advanced that 
a by-product of the common law and statutory policy initiatives lying at the heart of the 
regulation of managerial autonomy has been the emergence of differing behavioural 
standards in the employment relationship. In order to satisfy the common law and statutory 
obligations which they owe towards their employees, employers are expected to discharge a 
variety of standards of conduct and adjudicators must apply differing standards of review in 
evaluating the lawfulness of managerial discretion. These differing standards can be 
grouped into a hierarchy, exploring how they function to exert a higher or lower level of 
scrutiny of the managerial prerogative. The paper proceeds to explore the rationales for the 
promulgation of such differing behavioural standards in different decision-making contexts. 
Finally, it goes on to analyse whether such differing standards are justifiable from a 
formalistic and doctrinal perspective and considers the practicability and desirability of a 
modest package of reform consisting of limited re-alignment whereby certain standards 
would be harmonised in similar contexts.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The objective of this paper is to pursue a line of enquiry regarding employment rights which 
are promulgated as standards (rather than rules), the legitimacy of which is premised on the 
need to scrutinise managerial autonomy pursuant to a norm-setting, rather than norm-
reflecting agenda. Insights will be offered in relation to the expectations about the exercise of 
the managerial prerogative which the law transmits through such standards. At the fulcrum 
of the standard-setting process lies a tension between the recognition of the necessity of 
freedom of action on the part of the commercial operation of the employer, while at the same 
time forging a balance which is reflective of the law's concern to police the potential for the 
exploitation of employees. 
In this paper, the argument is advanced that a by-product of the common law and statutory 
initiatives lying at the heart of the regulation of managerial autonomy has been the 
emergence of differing behavioural standards of review in the employment relationship. The 
common law and statutory employment protection obligations which are imposed on 
employers entail that their decision making and general conduct be assessed by 
adjudicators in accordance with a variety of differing standards of review. Section 2 of this 
paper is essentially a descriptive undertaking whereby the differing standards present in the 
field of labour law are identified and then grouped into a hierarchy, exploring how they 
function to exert a higher or lower level of scrutiny of the managerial prerogative. Section 3 
of the paper proceeds to explore the rationales for the promulgation of such differing 
behavioural standards in different decision-making contexts. The paper goes on to analyse 
whether such differing standards are justifiable from a formalistic1 and doctrinal perspective 
and considers the practicability and desirability of a modest package of reform consisting of 
limited re-alignment whereby certain standards would be harmonised in similar contexts. 
Section 4 concludes. 
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2. THE EXISTENCE OF DIFFERING BEHAVIOURAL STANDARDS 
A. General 
Employment rights which are expressed as rules can be distinguished from those which are 
set out as standards. A standard is more open textured and less precise than a rule 
amounting to a tangible differential in formal substantive terms.2 Standards can be divided 
into standards of conduct and standards of review. Standards of conduct represent the law's 
method of erecting signposts about the nature of the behaviour expected of employers and 
are directed at employers. They represent standards against which employers may internally 
test their conduct and decision making. Meanwhile, standards of review are addressed to 
adjudicators and set the level at which the law expects independent adjudicators to 
scrutinise managerial action and decision making.3 Thus, standards of review entail an 
evaluative process whereby the decision making and conduct of an employer is 
assessed externally by an independent adjudicator. The fundamental hypothesis posited by 
the author in another paper4 was that the degree of scrutiny associated with a particular 
standard of review ought to inform our understanding of the importance which a system of 
labour law attaches to the fundamental values and policy considerations which underpin that 
employment right. In terms of a functionalist normative methodology5 which posits that 
labour law can be understood and ought to be shaped in accordance with the objectives 
which it is designed to serve, it was argued that the common law or legislature ought to (and 
would appear to)6 have regard to the strength of the values and policy factors which 
influence that particular employment right in fixing the intensity of the standard of review. 
Adopting the formulation of Allen, Jacobs and Strine,7 the paper proffered the normative 
proposition that the standard of conduct and standard of review ought to deviate and/or an 
adjudicator would be justified in modifying the standard of review so that it is more forgiving 
or stringent than the former, as the case may be, where (i) important policy considerations or 
fundamental values justify such a divergence or modification or (ii) it is clear that (a) more 
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than one decision may be reasonable in response to a given set of circumstances or (b) it is 
difficult for adjudicators to differentiate between ‘bad’ decisions taken by the employer from 
‘good’ decisions taken by an employer which turn out ‘badly’. A normative framework was 
tentatively constructed against which that hypothesis could be given greater clarity and 
strength by adopting a reliable metric against which intensities of review could be charted. 
The metric adopted was to plot standards in terms of the level of interference which they 
internally (by the employer itself) or externally (by an adjudicator) exert over the managerial 
prerogative, that is, the degree to which managerial action is called to account internally or 
externally by that standard.  
It should be clarified at this juncture that this paper is concerned with an examination of 
standards of review in labour law. That is to say that consideration will be given to the 
intensity of scrutiny attached to the standard of review in the context of differing employment 
rights from the perspective of the degree of interference which it wields over managerial 
autonomy—rather than the standard of conduct. It is submitted that there is little purpose in 
examining employment rights for different standards of conduct, since adjudicators will often 
be directed to apply standards of review which are set at a more deferential or stringent level 
of scrutiny. It is the standards of review which are more important, since these are the 
instruments which are applied by courts and tribunals to determine the liability of employers.  
With this in mind, it is submitted that there are five principal standards of review of the 
exercise of the managerial prerogative in the context of labour law today. Those standards 
are essentially parasitic or accessory to a particular employment right. Depending on the 
right concerned, the employer's conduct may be judged according to (i) an irrationality 
standard which is close to (yet conceptually distinct from) (ii) a subjective standard, to others 
on the basis of (iii) a mixture of subjective and objective standards, to some based on (iv) an 
objective standard and to others on (v) a proportionality standard. Thus, in diverse 
contexts—and as will be explained—sometimes in the same context, adjudicators are 
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expected to apply, and employers’ decisions are evaluated against diverse standards. The 
standards encountered by employers in the context of employment laws can be classified 
within a hierarchy with each set exerting greater or lesser control over the employer's 
freedom of autonomy. In this paper, these standards are charted from the least onerous to 
the most exacting on the employer in terms of the normative framework for measuring 
intensities of scrutiny discussed in the previous paper, that is, the extent of the intrusion into 
the managerial discretion of the employer.  
B. ‘Good Faith’ and Irrationality Standards 
Three implied terms of the contract of employment which are concerned with imposing 
standards of ‘good faith’ on the behaviour of the parties are first the implied term of mutual 
trust and confidence, secondly the implied term that an employer's decision to award (or not 
award) discretionary bonuses or benefits must not be made irrationally, perversely or 
contrary to good faith (‘the discretionary bonus/benefits implied term’)8 and finally the implied 
term that an employer will not dismiss an employee in order to avoid the making of 
guaranteed or conditional payments to the employee (the anti-avoidance implied 
term).9 These implied terms have been used by the courts and tribunals to police and 
regulate the exercise of power and discretion by employers in a manner which is not 
dissimilar to the supervisory jurisdiction of the administrative courts.10 But whilst each of 
these implied terms is both expressed in terms of good faith standards and function to 
control the exercise of discretionary powers on the part of the employer by effectively 
conferring employment rights in favour of employees, the behavioural expectations imposed 
on employers, whilst similar, are not quite aligned. For example, in Clark v Nomura 
International plc,11 Burton J explained the nature of the ‘irrationality/perversity/good faith’ test 
which applies in the context of the discretionary bonus/benefits implied term. He located the 
applicable standard between a lenient test of ‘capriciousness’ which ‘carr[ies] with it aspects 
of arbitrariness or domineeringness, or whimsicality and abstractedness’12 and a more 
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stringent test of ‘reasonableness’ which would enable a tribunal or court to substitute its own 
view for that of the employer, that is, a purely ‘objective reasonableness’ test. Instead, the 
irrationality/perversity test requires an adjudicator ‘to put [its]elf in the shoes of those making 
the decision’13 and directs it towards an enquiry as to whether no rational employer would 
have exercised its discretion in the way that it did.14 Speaking in the field of corporate law, as 
Eisenberg recognised, ‘a decision that fails to satisfy the rationality standard is a decision 
that cannot be coherently explained’.15 To that extent, the rationality standard entails an 
evaluative process which tends more towards the subjective than the objective. Thus, the 
standard of review in the case of the discretionary bonus/benefits implied term is loose and 
keeps the supervisory jurisdiction of the courts and tribunals within restricted bounds, 
circumscribing their scope of action, since it will only be in the most exceptional of cases that 
a ruling will be made against an employer.  
The test for assessing the conduct or omissions of the employer in the context of the 
discretionary bonus/benefits implied term can be contrasted with the test which is applicable 
for the purposes of determining whether the implied term of mutual trust and confidence has 
been breached. In determining whether trust has been destroyed, seriously damaged or 
undermined by the conduct or omissions of an employer, the courts and tribunals adopt an 
objective test.16 The distinction between a ‘rationality’ and ‘objective’ test is that in the case 
of the latter, an adjudicator has the power to override the judgment of the decision maker by 
freely applying its mind as to whether that person's actions, conduct or omissions were 
lawful or not. Thus, an adjudicator has the authority to substitute its own judgment for that of 
the decision maker, which occasions a more intensive evaluation of the employer's actings.17 
Whilst an objective test enables a court or tribunal to substitute its own judgment for that of 
the employer, in the case of the implied term of mutual trust and confidence, the objective 
test does not proceed on the basis of the extent to which the employer was ‘reasonable’.18 
Such an approach, as will be explained below, is appropriate in the case of the employer's 
duty to exercise reasonable care for the welfare of the employee. Instead, it is only where an 
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employer's conduct on an objective assessment results in the destruction or severe 
undermining of trust and confidence that an adjudicator will rule that there has been a 
breach of the implied term of mutual trust and confidence. The objective component inherent 
within the implied term of mutual trust and confidence affords the courts and tribunals a wide 
berth for manoeuvre in calling the behaviour of the employer to account. Meanwhile, the test 
which an adjudicator must apply as a means of determining whether the anti-avoidance 
implied term has been breached is not altogether clear from the case law.19 
What is clear is that the tests applicable in the case of each of the above three implied terms 
differ. The standard applicable in the case of the discretionary bonus/benefits implied term is 
much less stringent than that applicable in the case of the implied term of mutual trust and 
confidence. This is slightly odd, since both share many affinities as noted above. The 
rationales advanced by the judiciary for the formulation of the irrationality/perversity standard 
of review in the case of the discretionary bonus/benefits implied term are worthy of 
consideration at this stage.20 One gains the impression from the case law that the courts and 
tribunals were particularly concerned to construct a standard which was deferential to the 
employer.21 A standard of review based on reasonableness, namely ‘without reasonable or 
sufficient grounds’ was perceived to be too exacting a standard to expect an employer to 
discharge. Meanwhile, ‘capriciousness’ was too lax. But the precise reason why the courts 
and tribunals selected the test of rationality remains unexplained.  
It may be useful to speculate on the policy considerations which may have influenced the 
judiciary in formulating such a standard of review given the absence of any candid 
explanation in the case law. As a matter of policy, it may be wise for the courts and tribunals 
to devise a scheme which defers to an employer in forging the level of payment or award 
made to an employee in the case of a discretionary bonus or benefit. This is based on 
informational asymmetries which exist between employer and adjudicator and reflect an 
implicit recognition that employers will understand their business and the commercial 
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environment within which they operate better than any court or tribunal. This includes the 
best practices (and industry practices) designed to motivate and incentivise staff through the 
fashioning of the bonus, benefits or remuneration packages. Another policy reason might be 
reflective of the interplay between what is of course definitionally a contractual discretion and 
the nature of the standard of review. That is to say that to fix the level at which an 
adjudicator must assess an employer's decision not to award a discretionary bonus/benefit 
(or to award a discretionary bonus/benefit at a particular amount) at too high a point might be 
seen as not too far away from the judiciary overriding the discretionary nature of the 
contractual bonus. If a contract provides that an employer's decision to award a bonus or 
benefit is discretionary, then to apply an objective standard of review might be objectionable 
in that it gives a court or tribunal a free hand to replace the employer's judgment with that of 
its own. This might be viewed as coming too close to comfort to the courts rewriting the 
work-wage bargain struck by the parties in the employment contract.22 Thus, as a matter of 
policy, it may be advisable for the law to defer to the judgment of employers to a certain 
degree and fix a standard of review which is low, i.e. rationality.  
C. Subjective Standard 
Where an employee presents a complaint of unfair dismissal to an employment tribunal, 
he/she must first establish that he/she has been dismissed in terms of section 95(1) of the 
Employment Rights Act 1996 (ERA). As will be explained below, the determination of the 
existence of a dismissal under section 95(1) is conducted on an objective basis. If that has 
been achieved, in terms of section 98(1)(a) of the ERA, the onus then shifts to the employer 
to demonstrate the reason (or, if more than one, the principal reason) for the dismissal. At 
this juncture, questions arise as to whether the determination of the employer's reason for 
dismissal is a matter of fact or a legal issue and if it is the latter, what standard of review the 
court or tribunal should apply to the employer's state of mind? First, the authorities establish 
that the employer's real reason for the employee's dismissal is one of law, rather than 
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fact.23 That being the case, the enquiry is evaluative rather than factual and the attention 
turns to the appropriate standard of review. The wording of ERA does not directly address 
the point, but the authorities are clear that the tribunal and the court must look to discover 
what it was that subjectively motivated the employer: it is irrelevant that an objective intensity 
of scrutiny reveals that the subjective belief of the employer was in fact incorrect.24 The 
adjudicator has no power to substitute its own judgment for that of the employer as to what 
the ‘true’ or ‘real’ reason may have been. This results in a somewhat lax intensity of review, 
which is significant as it may be that an employer has mislabelled the reason for the 
dismissal, for example by attributing the reason as redundancy when in fact it was 
misconduct. So long as the subjective belief of the employer is genuine, that is sufficient for 
the section 98(1) stage of an unfair dismissal claim to have been safely negotiated.  
D. The ‘Range of Reasonable Responses’ Standard 
From the standpoint of the degree of scrutiny exerted upon the managerial prerogative, the 
‘range of reasonable responses’ standard of review is located somewhere above that of the 
‘irrationality/perversity’ and ‘subjective’ tests. All three of these tests share in common the 
importation of a margin of discretion for manoeuvre in favour of the employer, duly involving 
elements of subjectivity. Like the ‘irrationality/perversity’ standard, the discretion afforded to 
the employer by the ‘range’ test is not absolute. However, the latter curtails the managerial 
autonomy to a greater degree than the former, since it incorporates certain objective factors 
into its application.  
The most notorious area of labour law in which the ‘range’ or ‘band’ test is encountered is in 
the context of the determination of the reasonableness of a dismissal of an employee in 
terms of section 98(4) of the ERA for the purposes of the statutory concept of unfair 
dismissal.25 The range of reasonable responses formulation denies an adjudicator a free 
hand to substitute its own judgment for that of the employer.26 Instead, a tribunal is enjoined 
to ascertain the band of responses which a reasonable employer might take in face of the 
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particular actions or omissions of an employee. This part of the assessment implicitly imports 
elements of objectivity into proceedings. However, as noted above, it is not confined to the 
application of objective criteria since it amounts to a sophisticated amalgam of objective and 
subjective considerations.27 The subjective element is divisible into two components. First, in 
a ‘weak’ sense inasmuch as section 98(4) ERA specifically directs an adjudicator to take into 
account subjective criteria, such as the size and administrative resources of the employer 
and secondly, in a ‘strong’ sense to the extent that there is clearly scope for the employer to 
subjectively set the parameters of the adjudicator's enquiry by adopting internal practices 
and formal, written procedures and policies which underscore the particular economic 
interests of the organisation.28 
The range test has been criticised in the Employment Appeal Tribunal29 and by academic 
commentators,30 and referred to by the European Court of Human Rights31 as a form of a 
‘perversity’ test not dissimilar to the irrationality/perversity standard in the context of the 
discretionary bonus/benefits implied term.32 However, it is objectively demonstrable that 
there is a distinction between the two, albeit subtle.33 Rather than a court or tribunal being 
directed to make an enquiry as to whether no reasonable employer would have dismissed 
the employee in the circumstances of the case (which would be a difficult burden for an 
employee to discharge), the court or tribunal must identify a band or range of responses 
which a reasonable employer would take. If the decision or action taken, or sanction 
adopted, by the employer does not feature on the list of reasonable responses identified by 
the court or tribunal, the adjudicator must rule that such decision or action was 
unreasonable. By emphasising what is reasonable rather than what is unreasonable, the 
focus of the ‘range’ test is drawn in positive, rather than negative terms and so is different. 
This leads towards the point of demarcation between what is reasonable and unreasonable 
being fixed at a different spot than if the question found its expression in terms of 
unreasonableness or irrationality.34 Since the outcome of the application of the two 
standards is that the line between what is reasonable and unreasonable is drawn at different 
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places, it makes no sense to argue that they are conflated. If the standards were the same 
and simply expressions of the same approach, there would be no difference in the 
demarcation point.35 
Confined at one time to the question of the fairness of a dismissal for the purposes of section 
98(4) ERA, the range of reasonable responses test has branched out, leap-frogging over to 
fresh terrain in the past decade or so. Thus, a particular version of the range of reasonable 
responses standard was also applicable in the context of the justification defence in the case 
of ‘disability-related discrimination’ in section 3A(1) of the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 
(DDA). Although the statutory concept of ‘disability-related discrimination’ in section 3A(1) of 
the DDA was repealed when section 15 of the Equality Act 2010 (EA) came into force on 1 
October 2010, it must be stressed that it is of import for the analysis in this paper.36 Section 
3A(1)(b) of the DDA enabled an employer to justify the less favourable treatment of a 
disabled person for a reason related to his/her disability provided that the justification was 
‘both material to the circumstances of the particular case and substantial’.37 In Jones v Post 
Office,38 the Court of Appeal held that a tribunal should consider whether the reason 
advanced by the employer for the treatment of the disabled person fell within the range of 
what a reasonable employer would have relied on as a material and substantial reason for 
the less favourable treatment. Thus, a tribunal was not entitled to enquire whether the 
employer's reason for the disability-related discrimination was material and substantial and 
then substitute its own judgment for that of the employer if it disagreed, since that would 
have involved the application of a purely objective standard of scrutiny.39 Instead, the 
tribunal was required to ‘make a list’ of the reasons which reasonable employers would 
consider to be material and substantial for the less favourable treatment. If the reason 
advanced by the employer for the less favourable treatment in a particular case was not 
included on the tribunal's list, the employer would have failed to satisfy the section 3A(1)(b) 
DDA defence.  
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In the same context of disability discrimination, an employer owes a disabled employee a 
duty to make reasonable adjustments where the application of a provision, criterion or 
practice (PCP) or a physical feature of the employer's premises puts that employee at a 
substantial disadvantage in comparison with persons who are not disabled. The relevant 
statutory provisions are sections 20–2 of the EqA 2010 and were formerly set out in sections 
3A(2), 4A and 18B of the DDA which are now repealed. The standard of review in 
ascertaining whether the employer has breached the duty to make reasonable adjustments 
is one of objective reasonableness.40 The objective test legitimizes an adjudicator to 
undertake a wide scope of enquiry.  
Therefore, prior to the coming into force of the relevant provisions of the EqA on 1 October 
2010,41 as regards the protected characteristic of disability discrimination, in the case of the 
concept of disability-related discrimination under section 3A(1) of the DDA, the employer's 
conduct was assessed by reference to a ‘range of material and substantial reasons’ 
standard. This can be contrasted with the s. 3A(2) DDA duty to make reasonable 
adjustments, whereby an ‘objective reasonableness’ standard was applied by the 
tribunal.42 The former entailed a more forgiving evaluation of the employer's conduct, 
whereas the latter empowered an adjudicator to take a more interventionist approach. The 
temptation is to proclaim that the presence of differing standards in the context of the DDA 
rendered the law incoherent, since whether a disabled claimant who had suffered from 
prejudicial and discriminatory conduct at the hands of his/her employer obtained relief would 
depend on how the tribunal claim was framed, that is, as a section 3A(1) DDA or section 
3A(2) DDA claim. However, the temptation to proclaim the law as incoherent should be 
resisted on the basis that it proceeds on too simplistic an analysis. There are two reasons for 
such a position. First, an employer was disempowered from pleading a justification defence 
in terms of disability-related discrimination under section 3A(1)(b) DDA unless it had satisfied 
its duty to make reasonable adjustments in terms of section 3A(2) DDA. That is to say, the 
tribunal or court was required to determine first whether the employer owed the employee a 
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duty to make adjustments, what the content of any such duty would have been in the 
circumstances and what the position would have been if the employer had fulfilled any such 
duty that was incumbent on it.43 This is important, since it meant that the range of material 
and substantial reasons test associated with the employer's justification defence in section 
3A(1)(b) DDA would be postponed to the objective standard connected to the section 3A(2) 
DDA duty to make reasonable adjustments: only if the latter objective test was satisfied 
would engagement with the range of material and substantial reasons standard be required. 
Hence, in a number of cases, there was no need to consider the ‘range’ test.  
Secondly, in the case of Heathrow Express Operating Co. Ltd v Jenkins,44 Elias J (as he 
then was) opined that there was a ‘perfectly comprehensible rationale’ for the difference in 
the tests.45 The divergence could be explained by invoking the separate and differing 
implications of the application of section 3A(1) and (2) DDA on the employer's arrangements 
in running its commercial operation. The justification test in the context of disability-related 
discrimination operated at the more lenient range of material and substantial reasons 
standard in order to respect the prerogative afforded to management in choosing how to 
organise its business practices. Here, there was an implicit recognition in the law that there 
may be good commercial or other reasons for an employer to apply a commercial function or 
practice which nevertheless inadvertently resulted in a person who was disabled suffering 
less favourable treatment on the basis of a reason related to that person's disability. It is 
submitted that the effect of the Jones v Post Office approach to section 3A(1) and (3) DDA 
was to ensure that the concept of ‘disability-related’ discrimination in section 3A(1) DDA was 
not concerned about changing the employer's commercial operations but with assessing the 
weight of the rationales for certain practices which resulted in less favourable treatment by 
reference to a ‘material and substantial’ criterion. Meanwhile, the objective nature of the test 
applicable in the case of the duty to make reasonable adjustment in section 3A(2) DDA 
recognised that the legitimate arrangements designed by the employer may nonetheless 
result in a disabled employee suffering a substantial disadvantage. Here, the statutory 
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wording enjoined a tribunal to take a more interventionist approach by transmitting a clear 
signal that the employer's commercial practices required to be modified to comply with the 
law. Elias J's exposition of the rationale for the distinction in the tests recognised the far-
reaching scope of the employer's section 3A(2) DDA duty to make reasonable adjustments 
when compared with the employer's section 3A(1) DDA duty. That is to say that the former 
entailed an element of positive discrimination in favour of the disabled employee and a 
departure from the employer's general business practices, whereas the latter did not.46 
Nevertheless, despite Elias J's insightful contribution towards our understanding of the 
rationales for these differing standards in the case of the DDA, academic and judicial 
commentators expressed criticism or misgivings regarding the desirability of applying a 
variant of the range of reasonable responses standard to the employer's justification defence 
in section 3A(1) of the DDA. First, Davies argued that the range of reasonable responses 
standard of review was conceptually misplaced since it fails to direct employers to alter their 
existing behaviour.47 Furthermore, in the case of O’Hanlon v Revenue and Customs 
Commissioners,48 Sedley LJ expressed reservations regarding the suitability of the range 
test adopted by the Court of Appeal in Jones.49 One might also speculate that such 
reservations filtered down to the policy level, since section 15 of the EqA which repealed the 
concept of ‘disability-related discrimination’ and introduced the notion of ‘discrimination 
arising from disability’ replaces the range test with a proportionality test.50 The proportionality 
test amounts to an objective justification approach which is more questioning of the 
employer's conduct and so, in comparison with the Jones v Post Office approach to section 
3A(1) and (3) DDA, section 15(1)(b) of the EqA will serve to curtail the margin of discretion 
afforded to employers.  
Therefore, there is clear evidence of the movement of the range test beyond its original 
habitat of unfair dismissal. However, the story of legal migration and transplantation has not 
been one of uniform wholesale success. For example, an attempt to apply a variation of the 
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range of reasonable responses test in the context of the employer's proportionality defence 
applicable in a case of indirect sex discrimination (as governed by section 1(2)(b)(iii) of the 
Sex Discrimination Act and now by section 19(2)(d) of the EqA) was rejected by Pill LJ in the 
case of Hardy & Hansons plc v Lax.51 Pill LJ was of the view that in undertaking a review 
based on a proportionality criterion, an adjudicator is invited to form ‘its own judgment, upon 
a fair and detailed analysis of the working practices and business considerations involved, 
as to whether the proposal is reasonably necessary’.52 Moreover, there was a short-lived 
period in which the range of reasonable responses standard was deployed for the purposes 
of ascertaining whether an employee had been constructively dismissed in terms of section 
95(1)(c) ERA on the basis of a breach of the implied term of mutual trust and confidence.53 In 
the case of Buckland v Bournemouth University Higher Education Corp,54 Sedley LJ in the 
Court of Appeal rejected this approach and directed employment tribunals and courts to 
enquire whether an employee had been constructively dismissed in accordance with an 
objective standard of review, rather than a range of reasonable responses test.55 
What have been the motives or rationales for the materialisation of the interpretative 
technique of the ‘range of reasonable standard’ adopted by the judiciary towards section 
98(4) of the ERA? As remarked by Collins, the reasons for the adoption of such a test have 
not been clearly articulated by the judiciary.56 It is submitted that a revealing exposition of the 
rationales for the emergence of the range standard can be secured in terms of an 
appreciation of the justifications for a distinction between the standard of conduct expected 
of the employer and the standard of review which must be applied by an adjudicator. There 
are two reasons for a divergence in the intensity of managerial scrutiny attached to the 
standard of conduct and the standard of review in the context of section 98(4) of the ERA, 
with the latter drawn at a more exacting level than the former, namely (i) ‘practical fairness’ 
and (ii) policy choices. The notion of (i) ‘practical fairness’ recognises that divergence is 
justified on the ground that more than one decision by the employer may be appropriate 
when responding to difficult circumstances or where serious challenges confront 
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adjudicators in distinguishing between inherently misconceived decisions taken by an 
employer from ‘good’ decisions taken by an employer which simply turn out 
‘badly’.57 Meanwhile, (ii) above represents the idea that pursuing legitimate policy 
preferences or reflecting substantive policy considerations may present a suitable rationale 
for divorcing the standard of conduct from the standard of review.58 
This links in with the three particular explanations expressed in utilitarian or instrumental 
terms which Anderman has identified.59 The first explanation invokes the judicial reluctance 
towards the second guessing of managerial decisions. Elias has echoed this point by re-
formulating it in terms to the effect that the judiciary are less comfortable with engaging in a 
review of the substance of managerial decisions than they are with scrutinising the 
procedures applied by the employer in reaching such decisions.60 This represents a deep-
seated policy choice on the part of the judiciary. Secondly, the application of the standard 
can be perceived as a means of avoiding an over-intrusive approach to adjudication which 
might otherwise dissipate valuable, limited resources. Finally, the standard represents a 
compromise between managerial efficiency or autonomy and the protection of employees. 
Collins has also offered other explanations, such as the judiciary being keen to avoid a 
negative view of the legitimacy of their role, a judicial response to the ‘floodgates’ argument61 
and a conception of justice in dismissal articulated in terms of intervention duly restricted to 
circumstances where the actions of employees have not resulted in harm to the employer's 
legitimate commercial interests.62 Indeed, in the view of Collins, the ‘range test’ does not 
actually set standards, but instead sets boundaries and is norm reflecting, rather than norm 
setting.63 He argues that a more fitting conception of justice in dismissal in terms of the 
statutory test of unfair dismissal would be captured by a test expressed in terms of a 
proportionality standard.64 Although the judiciary categorised the range of reasonable 
responses test as more or less the same thing as a proportionality standard in the cases 
of X v Y65 and Pay v Lancashire Probation Service,66 it is submitted that the European Court 
of Human Rights in Pay v UK67 rightly took the view that they were conceptually distinct.68 
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E. Objective Standards 
In the field of labour law, an objective standard is applied in a number of particular contexts. 
First, an objective test is harnessed as a means of ascertaining whether an employer has 
breached the implied term of the contract of employment which enjoins it to exercise 
reasonable care for the physical and psychiatric welfare of its employees. The standard of 
care associated with the implied duty of care is whether the employer acted reasonably and 
prudently, objectively construed.69 Such an objective reasonableness standard directs an 
adjudicator towards an enquiry of what a reasonable person would have done in the factual 
circumstances, taking into account in particular the foreseeability of harm, the magnitude of 
the risk of that harm occurring, the gravity of the potential harm, the cost and practicability of 
preventing it and the justifications for running the risk. If the adjudicator rules that the 
reasonable person on an objective assessment would have acted in a manner, or taken 
steps, which the employer failed to take, the employer will be deemed to be in breach of 
duty.  
Secondly, whether an employer (or employee for that matter) has breached the implied term 
of mutual trust and confidence is also assessed by reference to an objective standard. The 
adjudicator's task is channelled towards an analysis of the impact of the employer's conduct 
on the employee and the objective nature of the enquiry enables a court or tribunal to 
substitute its own judgment for that of the employer. If the adjudicator is of the view that the 
actions or decisions of the employer have, without reasonable and proper cause, destroyed 
or seriously damaged the trust and confidence inherent in the employment relationship, the 
employer will be held to be in breach regardless of its motive or subjective intentions.70 
Thirdly, sections 20–22 of the EqA71 provide that an employer has a statutory duty to make 
‘reasonable’ adjustments to the workplace (premises or provisions, criteria and practices 
applied by the employer) to accommodate its disabled employees. In terms of Collins v 
Royal National Theatre Board Ltd72 and the judgment of Kay LJ in Smith v Churchills 
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Stairlifts plc,73 the judiciary have drawn the standard of review in terms of an ‘objective 
reasonableness’ standard. This affords a wide berth to an adjudicator to investigate and 
intervene. Fourth, in ascertaining whether an employee has been dismissed in terms of 
section 95(1) of the ERA, the tribunals and courts must apply an objective 
approach.74 Finally, the judgment of Mummery LJ in London Ambulance Service NHS Trust v 
Small75 is suggestive of the application of an objective test in determining whether there is 
conduct on the part of the employee which establishes contributory fault in an unfair 
dismissal case, that is, that he/she contributed to his/her own dismissal. Mummery LJ made 
a distinction between the adjudicator's review of the employer's decision to dismiss (which 
attracts the range of reasonable responses standard and is determinative of employer 
liability) and the intensity of review to be adopted in determining the extent of the employee's 
contributory fault. In the context of the latter, it is incumbent on an adjudicator to take into 
account the full range of facts and to form its own view, that is, to apply its own judgment. 
However, Mummery LJ ruled that this is not an approach open to the adjudicator in 
ascertaining the reasonableness of the dismissal itself.76 
This leads to an important question. That is to say, what have been the motives for the 
materialisation of such standards of review? First, in the context of an enquiry as to whether 
the employer has discharged the standard of care for the purposes of the implied contractual 
duty of care, the rationale for the objective nature of the standard is predicated on the need 
to ensure fair and consistent decisions. Moreover, law and economics scholars have argued 
that the ‘information cost of determining each [employer’s] intelligence and ability to make 
judgments of this sort would be too great to justify departing from the reasonable-man 
standard’.77 Secondly, as for the scrutiny of the conduct of the employer in the case of the 
implied term of mutual trust and confidence, one might conjecture that the objective test is 
also based on a desirability to avoid inconsistent decisions in the law. If the presence of a 
breach of the implied term of mutual trust depended on the subjective intentions or motives 
of employers, then the same conduct in different cases would result in different outcomes. 
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Moreover, in Malik v BCCI,78 Lord Steyn endorsed the objective approach with the rationale 
that it reflected ‘classic contract law principles’.79 One might also hypothesise that an indirect 
influencing factor on the emergence of a wider scope of review (in the guise of the objective 
test) in the case of implied term of mutual trust and confidence has been a recognition by the 
judiciary that de-unionisation, de-collectivisation, privatisation and the growth in globalisation 
over the past 30 years or so have resulted in lower job security for workers and a 
concomitant increase in their vulnerability.80 
Turning to the rationale for the applicability of an objective standard in the case law which 
determines whether an employee has been dismissed under section 95(1) of the ERA for the 
purposes of the statutory unfair dismissal regime, this can perhaps be attributed to the 
somewhat beguiling capacity of the tribunals and courts to cling to approaches and concepts 
inherent within the common law of the contract of employment. The process adopted by the 
tribunals and courts reveals that they have construed section 95(1) of the ERA in 
accordance with the traditional language of contract law as a means of fashioning its 
normative content rather than treating the statute as an autonomous self-contained body of 
regulation. In terms of the common law which regulates the termination of the contract of 
employment, an objective approach has traditionally been applied. Since the language of 
section 95(1) of the ERA includes terms such as ‘termination’ and ‘contract’, the tribunals 
and courts have resorted to the objective approach with which they are familiar.81 The 
rationale for the existence of an objective standard in the context of the assessment of 
contributory fault in an unfair dismissal case, that is, whether the employee contributed to 
his/her own dismissal, is similar to that which applies in the case of section 95(1) of the ERA. 
It relies on the objective common law approach to the evaluation of an individual's 
contributory fault in the law of tort and delict. Finally, with regard to the reasonable 
adjustments duty of an employer in the case of sections 20–22 of the EqA, the reasoning for 
the objective nature of the standard has been explained above. That is to say that the 
objective nature of the duty is desirable since the duty is concerned with changing the 
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commercial practices of the employer where their effect is to substantially disadvantage 
disabled employees, enjoining positive discrimination in their favour.  
F. The Proportionality Standard 
‘Proportionality’ is another standard which is applied to judge the conduct, actions or 
decisions of employers in the context of the employment relationship. It is encountered in the 
field of discrimination law which prohibits indirect discrimination on the basis of sex, race, 
religion, belief, gender reassignment, marriage, civil partnership, sexual orientation and age. 
The test directs an adjudicator to enquire whether the application of a provision, criterion or 
practice (‘PCP’) by an employer amounts to a ‘proportionate means of achieving a legitimate 
aim’.82 Thus, it is applied as a form of managerial defence to a PCP which is prima facie (i) 
indirectly discriminatory, (ii) directly age discriminatory or (iii) discriminatory in consequence 
of an employee's disability. The proportionality standard implements EU law and in particular 
the text of Articles 2(1)(b), 2(2)(b) and 2(2)(b)(i) of the Recast Equal Treatment 
Directive,83 the Racial Discrimination Directive84 and the Framework Directive.85 The actual 
text of each of the aforementioned Directives and the interpretation of the proportionality 
standard in Bilka-Kaufhaus v Weber von Hartz86 and Enderby v Frenchay Health 
Authority87 impose a requirement on the tribunal or court to ascertain whether the means of 
achieving a real need on the part of the employer (that is, the legitimate aim) is ‘appropriate 
and necessary’. This is known as the ‘least restrictive means’ approach to proportionality 
and represents a slightly different emphasis than the UK ‘proportionate means’ formulation. 
It breaks down into a three-stage approach which requires the adjudicator to undertake a 
critical evaluation of first the business needs of the employer which is essentially an 
objective pursuit in nature,88 and secondly whether the application of the PCP is appropriate 
and finally whether it is necessary. If the application of the PCP is not necessary to achieve 
the real need, the proportionality standard is not satisfied. Thus, it is difficult for an employer 
to discharge the ‘least restrictive means’ form of the proportionality standard. Bamforth, 
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Malik and Cinneide have commented that ‘there is concern that the domestic legislation 
makes use of a weaker formula’,89 imposing a less rigorous standard of review. This is based 
on the Barry v Midland Bank90 formulation which is applied domestically and adopts a 
standard of review which is variable in its intensity and entails balancing the discriminatory 
impact or harm suffered by the employee against the employer's need to achieve a 
legitimate aim. The greater the harm suffered by the employee, the greater the employer's 
need must be. However, like the ‘least restrictive means’ approach, the balancing method 
adopted in Midland Bank also enjoins an adjudicator to approach its task on an objective 
basis.  
Although the proportionality standard is objective in nature, in its operation in practice it is 
slightly different from a purely objective standard. First, the proportionality test possesses the 
attractive feature of divorcing the adjudicator's review from the requirement to make 
comparisons with other ‘proportionate’ employers which in certain circumstances may be 
inappropriate. Furthermore, traditionally understood, proportionality does not involve the 
courts substituting their own judgment on the merits of a case for that of the employer (as 
the primary decision-maker).91 Moreover, there is an argument that a proportionality 
standard demands a more reasoned justification from employers for the treatment afforded 
to their employees. Hence, the factual bases which guided their actions must be ventilated 
before an adjudicator, imposing a more intrusive level of judicial activism than a purely 
objective standard.92 Another difference from the objective standard of review is that the 
proportionality standard involves the application of a variable intensity of review depending 
on the nature of the prohibited ground of discrimination and the consequences of the 
discriminatory treatment.93 For example, in certain instances of discriminatory treatment, the 
level of review incorporates an appreciable margin of deference whereas in others, the 
intervention of the court or tribunal is much more intense. This variability feature can be 
contradistinguished from the objective standard of review where the notion of a variable 
degree of scrutiny of managerial action in differing contexts has been expressly rejected by 
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the judiciary.94 Finally, proportionality can also be contrasted with the range of reasonable 
responses standard, in the sense that the latter is norm reflecting rather than norm setting. 
Further, the latter is generally one-dimensional in nature since it concentrates on the actions 
of the employer only,95 whereas the former is two-dimensional, focussing on the actions and 
needs of the employer and the harm caused to the employee, duly balancing them off 
against each other.  
The rationale for the introduction of the proportionality standard is linked to the principle of 
liberal democracy and on a more general note it espouses the notion that ‘regulatory 
intervention must be suitable to achieve its aims’,96 whether the source of such intervention 
is a public body, such as a local authority or Government department, or indeed a private 
employer. Another rationale for the emergence of the proportionality standard is immersed in 
its connection ‘to the principle of respect for fundamental rights’.97 Indeed, in the employment 
law context where one encounters the proportionality standard, it is indelibly linked to the 
fundamental principle of equal treatment and equality of opportunity. Particularised to the law 
of equal treatment in the context of employment, underpinning the proportionality standard 
lies a recognition that there may be an objective factor unrelated to a prohibited ground of 
discrimination which supplies explanatory force for the treatment afforded to an employee 
which is not only suitable but also necessary to achieve that objective purpose.  
 
3. A HIERARCHY OF BEHAVIOURAL STANDARDS 
A. Introduction 
At the beginning of this paper, the view was expressed that the standards of review which 
adjudicators are expected to apply can be classified within a hierarchy and charted across a 
spectrum. A normative framework for the measurement of intensities of review can be 
erected which is predicated on the notion of the level of interference which they exert over 
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managerial autonomy. In terms of this framework or metric, the five standards of review 
which have been discussed in this paper will be mapped across a spectrum from the most 
interfering to the least exacting on the employer, with the relative intensities of review being 
plotted in terms of ‘weak’ to ‘strong’ intervention. In this vein, one can think of a hierarchy of 
standards with proportionality exercising the most constraint on the employer, closely 
followed by the objectivity standard, with the range of reasonable responses test resting 
somewhere near the middle, closely followed by the subjective standard of scrutiny, with the 
irrationality/perversity test exerting the least interference over the employer's prerogative 
powers at the bottom of the range. See Figure 1 for further details. Table 1 labels the relative 
rights against the standards of review.  
In formulating such figures, one must recall that the nature of the review in the case of the 
standards themselves is not always linear. There are a variety of reasons for articulating this 
caveat. First, the proportionality test is not exactly uniform in its application, since the degree 
of scrutiny of the primary decision maker which is associated with the standard varies in 
intensity and whilst it does not empower adjudicators to impose their own judgment over 
employers, it does invite them to engage in a more intrusive review of the employer's 
practices than that of the range and the irrationality standards. Secondly, in some cases, like 
is not being compared with like, since the range and proportionality tests entail fluctuating 
intensities of review, whilst the irrationality and objective standards do not, since they are 
fixed. The level of interference in the employer's prerogative powers brought to bear by the 
range test is context dependent, varying in accordance with the weight attached to certain 
objective and subjective considerations.98 Similarly, the degree of intrusion associated with 
the proportionality standard is protean and depends on the relative strength of the legitimate 
aims of an employer and the concomitant harm sustained by an employee. This can be 
contrasted with fixed standards such as the rationality, subjective and objective approaches 
where the notion of a fluctuating, case-specific intensity of scrutiny is unsound. 
Nevertheless, it is submitted that this does not detract from the underlying contention that 
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the intrinsic nature of the standards can be charted in terms of a hierarchy at a more general 
level of analysis.  
B. Disadvantages 
The principal difficulty with an autonomous body of law such as labour law possessing 
different standards in the context of different employment rights is that the facts of cases 
cannot be put into neat pockets in the same way as the rights and the standards. In practice, 
when an employee presents a complaint to an employment tribunal, or initiates a common 
law action before a court, that complaint or action may well entail a claim for breach or 
infringement of a right which attracts a weaker standard of review alongside a claim for 
breach or infringement of a right which is based on a stronger standard. A good example 
would be the situation where a disabled employee claims unfair dismissal (a section 98(4) 
ERA complaint) and a breach of the duty to make reasonable adjustments (a section 20 EqA 
complaint) in the same case. The fairness of the dismissal in terms of section 98(4) of the 
ERA will be judged according to the range of reasonable responses standard, but the duty to 
make reasonable adjustments on the same set of facts will be examined on a purely 
objective basis. As a practitioner acting for an employee, given the laxity associated with the 
range test, the temptation may present itself to pursue the EqA claim with more vigour given 
the comparative strength of scrutiny of the objective standard and the availability of 
uncapped compensation in the case of the disability discrimination claim.  
Moreover, rather confusingly, complaints or actions based on a claim for breach of certain 
rights in the same employment context sometimes attract different standards and there are 
also circumstances where the law prescribes that specific employment rights themselves will 
involve more than one stage of analysis with a particular standard applied at one stage and 
then a differing standard at a later stage. On the latter point, the statutory employment right 
not to be unfairly dismissed is the paradigm. The establishment of the dismissal, the reason 
for the dismissal and the fairness of the dismissal are approached on a sequential basis, but 
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are evaluated completely differently. For example, first, whether the employee has been 
dismissed in terms of section 95(1) of the ERA will be assessed pursuant to an objective 
standard, whereupon the evaluation of the employer's reason for that dismissal under 
section 98(1), (2), (2A), (3) or (3A) of the ERA will proceed on the basis of a subjective test 
and finally, the fairness of the dismissal in terms of section 98(4) of the ERA will be judged 
according to the range of reasonable responses standard. Finally, it is possible for 
circumstances to exist where an employee or employer might have been more successful if 
their case had been brought on the basis of an alternative head of claim which imposes a 
less forgiving standard of review on the employer. For example, an employee who was 
unsuccessful in his claim that his employer's failure to pay a discretionary bonus was 
irrational may have been better off by claiming that the failure to pay the bonus amounted to 
a breach of the implied term of mutual trust and confidence—which would be assessed on 
purely objective criteria.  
The current balance in labour law which is forged between the power of management and 
the labour force is also open to the charge that the presence of diverse standards operates 
to increase transaction costs, which are externalised by employers by passage on to 
employees and consumers of their products and services. One might argue that the 
presence of differing behavioural expectations sends mixed signals to employers about the 
level of expectation which the law has regarding their conduct, actions and decisions in the 
workplace. How the standards are applied, and accordingly, the strength of the scrutiny 
exerted by an adjudicator over the decision making of an employer, are dependent on how 
the evidence and the facts are presented—which is a particularly arbitrary way to decide 
how the law ought to operate. Given the complexity of the legal position, external 
professional advice is crucial to enable employers to understand and apply the law correctly. 
Moreover, from the viewpoint of adjudicators, diverse standards of review impose adverse 
mental gymnastics which raises concerns about the legitimacy of their role and the 
soundness of their decisions. The recent quartet of cases in Abbey National v 
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Fairbrother,99 Barratt v Accrington and Rossendale College,100 Claridge v Daler Rowney 
Ltd.101 and Buckland v Bournemouth University Higher Education Corp,102 which debated 
whether it was doctrinally sound and generally appropriate for the range of reasonable 
responses test to be deployed for the purpose of determining whether an employee has 
been constructively dismissed under section 95(1)(c) of the ERA, are testament to the 
difficulties which can arise. The costs and degree of litigation may increase since there is 
greater opportunity for appeals to be made on the basis that the tests have been applied 
incorrectly by lower courts or tribunals. Considering this factor from the viewpoint of the 
employee, one might argue that the current balance indirectly leads to less job security since 
increased costs and the inability to plan smoothly will deter employers from hiring further 
staff.  
Thus, from a formalistic perspective of labour law, that is, a perspective which treats labour 
law as an autonomous discipline which strives towards its own internal intelligibility in the 
mould of the arguments advanced by Weinrib (which are applied towards private law as a 
legal institution and discrete areas of private law), the perception is that the law lacks 
coherency. That is to say that the normative connections which the presence of diverse 
standards articulate between the various components of labour law are such that ‘the 
incremental transformation or reinterpretation or even … repudiation of specific decisions [is 
necessary] so as to make them conform to a wider pattern of coherence’. 103 The sense in 
which the word coherence’ is used here differs from ‘consistency’. As MacCormick has 
persuasively argued, consistency is satisfied if a grouping of rules or standards do not 
contradict each other. However, although such a grouping may be non-contradictory, they 
will be ‘incoherent’ if, as ‘a set of propositions … taken together, [they do not] make sense in 
[their] entirety’. 104 Thus, the overall thrust of the formalistic objection is that the standards of 
review ought to be reformed in order that there is a better degree of coherency and 
consistency in the field of labour law.  
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C. Justifications 
There is a temptation from a formalist perspective to express the view that the law is 
inefficient and incoherent and in need of wholesale reform for the reasons advanced above. 
However, if one is seeking to reflect the importance of an employment right on grounds of 
policy or from the perspective of constitutional or human rights or the recognition of 
fundamental values, it may be logical and valid to establish differing behavioural standards in 
the same or broadly similar contexts. Hence, the counter argument based on a functionalist 
analysis of labour law—that is, a philosophy which posits that a body of law can only be 
properly understood in light of non-legal disciplines such as economics, political theory, 
etc.—is that differing contexts demand differing standards. In the absence of differing 
standards, there would be insufficient particularity which is not an efficient economic policy 
goal.105 Moreover, objectivity is only really appropriate where there is only one or very few 
appropriate or acceptable decisions which can be taken by management when faced with 
certain events. One might also adopt the position that divergences in legal standards 
represent a form of balancing mechanism in response to the prevalence of Governmental 
policy preferences in favour of fostering managerial adaptability, flexibility and ‘light touch’ 
regulation.106 In other words, that in return for Governmental support for the flexibilisation of 
the workplace and limited regulation of the labour market over the past 30 years or so, 
employers must be expected to handle differing standards of review in the context of 
different—and sometimes the same—employment rights.  
The intensities of scrutiny associated with the differing standards of review also enable us to 
understand the relative significance of various employment rights. There is a clear co-
relation between the intensity of scrutiny associated with a standard of review and the 
employment right to which that standard is attached. That is to say that the greater the 
deference to the employer associated with the selected standard of review, the less 
important the law would appear to treat the right and the latent values which influence its 
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content and scope of application. This is a crucial point, since it ensures that the degree of 
scrutiny of managerial discretion brought to bear by an adjudicator in the context of an 
employment right is pitched at a level which recognises fundamental precepts and the 
collective goals of the community. On this basis, equipped with the benefit of Table 1, 
employment rights can be charted in terms of a hierarchy of significance which is set out in 
Figure 2.  
D. A Case for Limited Re-alignment? 
In advance of any general consideration of the necessity of any programme of reform of 
standards of review in labour law, it is submitted that there is a prima facie case for some 
limited re-alignment of standards in similar and identical employment contexts. As the author 
has argued elsewhere,107 the normative content of the discretionary bonus/benefits implied 
term and the anti-avoidance implied term ought to be re-conceptualised. It is submitted that 
such a rationalisation ought to be conducted within the framework of the implied term of 
mutual trust and confidence, which is also an implied term steeped in the ‘good faith’ 
regulation of discretionary powers. Thus, in determining whether an employer's decision not 
to award a bonus (or pitch a bonus at a particular financial level) is unlawful, the applicable 
standard ought to be objective in nature. Likewise, in the case of an adjudicator's enquiry 
under the rubric of the anti-avoidance implied term, an objective test should be applied. In 
terms of such a framework, an objective standard would be applied in order to test whether 
the employer has dismissed an employee in order to avoid the making of guaranteed or 
conditional payments to the employee. As has been noted elsewhere, it is objectionable for 
varying standards to be deployed ‘within a single type of case having a single common 
topic’,108 namely the implied terms based on good faith and the law governing the content 
and nature of the implied term of mutual trust and confidence.  
As for the broader assertion that labour law as an autonomous body of law displays a lack of 
coherence by virtue of the existence of differing behavioural standards in the same contexts 
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and differing contexts, on balance, it is submitted that there is considerable merit in such a 
view notwithstanding the validity of the justifications explored above. Therefore, one could 
envisage merit in undertaking a full-scale process of simplification and re-alignment. This is 
fortified by the fact that adjudicators seem to take diametrically opposed views of what level 
of scrutiny a standard of review entails or sometimes conflate two of them together.109 To 
recap, from a formalist perspective, the argument has been advanced that the recalibration 
of standards of review is required in order to build a more rational body of labour law. 
Secondly, labour law is open to the charge that it is confusing and costly for employers and 
adjudicators to apply. For these reasons, a comprehensive simplification is attractive and 
one means of rationalising the standards of review would be in accordance with a preferred 
policy perspective, yet to be identified. However, a note of caution ought to be struck. Whilst 
there is indeed force in such arguments, rather than accede to calls that law reform is 
crucial, it is perhaps more compelling to investigate and establish how the law and the 
concomitant standards are actually being applied in legal practice before one rushes to 
judgment. This would involve undertaking empirical research to ascertain how practising 
lawyers approach and apply the standards of review which attach to employment rights. The 
emphasis would be on the legal processes and strategies which are deployed by employees, 
employers and their respective legal advisers in dealing with (i) disputes and/or (ii) initiated 
legal complaints or actions based on particular employment rights. By identifying the 
approaches of the main protagonists and their advisers to disputes arising inside and outside 
the tribunals and courts, it is submitted that a well-balanced picture of how standards are 
being applied will emerge. In particular, such empirical research would reveal how standards 
of review are understood by legal practitioners and the constraints under which they and 
their employer clients perceive themselves to be labouring.  
As to the methodology of the research, one could envisage value in undertaking empirical 
research which focuses on interviews with the legal advisers of employees and employers. 
However, in undertaking such an analysis, from a theoretical perspective, the writer is alive 
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to the necessity of avoiding the inevitability of a binary conclusion, i.e. that employees, 
employers and legal practitioners either do or do not perceive themselves to be operating 
under constraints as a consequence of the presence of the hierarchy of diverse standards. 
Instead, the writer's objective is to keep open the possibility of the emergence of more 
nuanced conclusions which may signpost the way to alternative directions in which future 
research may proceed.  
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, the writer has sought to place a spotlight on the differing standards of review in 
labour law. Some standards subject the managerial prerogative to a limited degree of 
interference and others, by contrast, entail a more acute curtailment of the employer's 
freedom of autonomy. Such diverse standards have been charted and explored as well as 
the forces and justifications which have shaped them. It is submitted that when one uncovers 
the rationales in favour of and against such a hierarchical structure, they are significant for 
the evolution and our understanding of labour law. They expose the extent to which different 
employment rights are policed, enabling them to be plotted in terms of a hierarchy of 
importance. Is it sustainable for the employment relationship to continue to be regulated in a 
manner in which adjudicators are expected to apply differing standards of review attracting 
varying intensities of scrutiny of the managerial prerogative, sometimes in the same cases? 
This paper suggests that this question ought to be answered in the negative. On balance, 
the disadvantages of a hierarchy of differing standards of review outweigh the merits and a 
positive case can be made for some limited re-alignment and potentially a wholesale 
recalibration. The question is whether such a far-reaching agenda of reform ought to be 
pursued on the basis of policy considerations and/or empirical investigation alone and this is 
an issue which ought to be addressed at a future point.  
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Footnotes 
1 A formalistic methodology treats labour law as an autonomous discipline which strives 
towards its own internal intelligibility ‘from inside’ in the mould of the arguments advanced by 
Ernest Weinrib in E. Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1995) 8–16.  
2 Diver has forged a distinction between rules and standards in terms of the degree of 
transparency and accessibility of the legal command, C. S. Diver, ‘The Optimal Precision of 
Administrative Rules’ (1983) 93 Yale Law Journal 65, 67 and also L. Kaplow, ‘Rules versus 
Standards: An Economic Analysis’ (1992–1993) 42 Duke Law Journal 557, 561.  
3 M. A. Eisenberg, ‘The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards of Review in 
Corporate Law’ (1993) 62 Fordham Law Review 437; W. T. Allen, J. E. Jacobs, L. B. Strine 
Jr, ‘Realigning the Standard of Review of Director Due Care with Delaware Public Policy: A 
Critique of Van Gorkom and its Progeny as a Standard of Review Problem’ (2002) 96 North 
Western University Law Review 449.  
4 D. Cabrelli, ‘Rules and Standards in the Workplace: A Perspective from the Field of Labour 
Law’ (2011) 31 Legal Studies (forthcoming).  
5 A functionalist methodology denies the proposition that law or a discrete legal discipline 
(such as labour law) can be understood as an autonomous body of learning internally by 
reference to its own sources and claims instead that insights about the law or a particular 
body of law can only properly be garnered in light of non-legal disciplines such as 
economics, political theory, moral philosophy, etc., on which see C. McCrudden, ‘Legal 
Research and the Social Sciences’ (2006) 122 Law Quarterly Review 632.  
6 That much is clear from the judgment of Elias J in Heathrow Express Operating Co. Ltd. v 
Jenkins [2007] All ER (D) 144 (Feb) at paras 40–1, where the point was made that the 
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Table 1. 
 
 
Standard of Review Employment Right(s) 
 
Proportionality Test 
 
Right of an employee not to be indirectly 
discriminated against on the basis of a 
disproportionate application of a 
provision, criteria or practice by the 
employer.  
 
 
Objective test 
 
(1) Right of an employee to have the 
employer exercise reasonable care for 
his physical and psychiatric welfare; 
 
(2) Right of an employer not to have trust 
and confidence in the employment 
relationship destroyed or seriously 
undermined without reasonable and 
proper cause; 
 
(3) Right of disabled employee to have 
employer make reasonable adjustments 
to physical features of the workplace or 
provisions, criteria or practices applied by 
or on behalf of the employer; 
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(4) Determination of the existence of a 
‘dismissal’ under section 95(1) of the 
ERA for the purposes of the employee’s 
statutory right not to be dismissed under 
section 94 of the ERA; and 
 
(5) Assessment of the extent of an 
employee’s contributory fault to his/her 
unfair dismissal in context of the 
employee’s right not to be unfairly 
dismissed under section 94 of the ERA. 
 
Range of Reasonable Responses Test 
 
(1) Evaluation of reasonableness of 
an employee’s dismissal under 
section 98(4) of the ERA for the 
purposes of the employee’s right 
not to be unfairly dismissed 
under section 94 of the ERA; and 
 
(2) Right of an employee not to be 
treated less favourably for a 
reason related to his/her 
disability. 
 
Subjective Test 
 
Determination of the employer’s 
reason for the employee’s dismissal 
under section 98(1) of the ERA for 
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the purposes of the employee’s 
statutory right not to be dismissed 
under section 94 of the ERA; and 
 
Rationality Test 
 
Right of an employee in the context of 
the discretionary bonus/benefits implied 
term. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. 
 
 
 
Most Significant 
 
Right of an employee not to be indirectly discriminated against on the basis of a 
disproportionate application of a provision, criteria or practice by the employer. 
 
 
(1) Right of an employee to have the employer exercise reasonable care for his 
physical and psychiatric welfare; 
 
(2) Right of an employer not to have trust and confidence in the employment 
relationship destroyed or seriously undermined without reasonable and proper cause; 
 
(3) Right of disabled employee to have employer make reasonable adjustments to 
physical features of the workplace or provisions, criteria or practices applied by or on 
behalf of the employer; 
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(4) Determination of the existence of a ‘dismissal’ under section 95(1) of the ERA for 
the purposes of the employee’s statutory right not to be dismissed under section 94 
of the ERA; and 
 
(5) Assessment of the extent of an employee’s contributory fault to his/her unfair 
dismissal in context of the employee’s right not to be unfairly dismissed under section 
94 of the ERA. 
 
(1) Evaluation of reasonableness of an employee’s dismissal under section 98(4) 
of the ERA for the purposes of the employee’s right not to be unfairly 
dismissed under section 94 of the ERA; and 
 
(2) Right of an employee not to be treated less favourably for a reason related to 
his/her disability. 
 
Determination of the employer’s reason for the employee’s dismissal under section 
98(1) of the ERA for the purposes of the employee’s statutory right not to be 
dismissed under section 94 of the ERA; 
 
Right of an employee in the context of the discretionary bonus/benefits implied term 
and the anti-avoidance implied term. 
 
Least Significant 
 
